【Tadeusz Kowalik】　　体制転換の10年━バンカリーとポーランドの教訓から 　　→【討論】

Tadeusz Kowalik "The Ugly Face of Polish Success"

Lazzlo Szamuely "Two market oriented reforms under a mono-party social-political system"

Professor Szamuely began his presentation by noting that although the paper he had prepared had compared the experience of economic reform in Hungary during the 1960s and 1970s with contemporary economic reform in China, he had chosen to focus in his presentation on Hungary's experiences over the last ten years in order to address the seminar's concerns more directly. He also noted that in response to Professor Kowalik's paper, which he described as having been quite value-loaded and which had focused upon the "ugly aspects" of economic transformation in Poland, he wanted to show some other sides to recent developments. He chose this approach not to deny the validity of Professor Kowalik's comments but simply to show that reality has been multi-faceted.

To set the context for his comments, Professor Szamuely briefly discussed the data presented in a series of tables which showed changes in GDP, industrial production, the CPI, and unemployment in 14 transition economies from 1991 to 2000, as well as one which compared the geographical distribution of the exports of the same 14 economies in 1994 and 1998. He then stated that his talk would be divided into three sections: first, a very brief overview of divergent economic development in the transition economies; second, a discussion of the main features, results, and problems of economic transformation in Hungary; and third, some comments on how we might go about evaluating the positive achievements, drawbacks, and prospects of the Hungarian experience and the experiences of transition economies more generally.

1. Overview

Professor Szamuely's overview of recent economic developments focused primarily on the sobering information presented in the tables showing change in GDP and industrial production. Using these tables, he argued, it is possible to divide the transition economies into three main groups.

1. The Former Soviet Union, represented in the tables by Russia and Ukraine. These countries have shown an almost unexceptioned year-by-year decline in both GDP and industrial production, with the result that by 1998 Russian GDP had sunk to 50-55% of the level of 1990 (with industrial production declining even more), while in Ukraine both GDP and industrial production were around 40% of 1990 levels. Both of these countries showed positive performances in 1999, suggesting that the bottom of their recessions may have been reached. However, Professor Szamuely remains pessimistic about the prospects of both economies because of the very slow pace of structural change (if indeed any change is occurring) and the very low volume of investment (fixed capital investment is now 20% of the level of 10 years ago in Russia, and grew only 1% in 1999) that they show. Capital flight continues in these economies, though it seems to be slowing.

2. The Balkan countries of Southeastern Europe. Economic performances in these countries have been very mixed, largely because (with the exception of Slovenia) they were significantly less developed than the Central European countries in 1989, and also, of course, because of the wars attendant upon the breakup of Yugoslavia.

3. The countries of East-Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary), on the other hand, have been comparatively successful, in that their GDPs have returned to the levels of a decade ago or slightly higher.

2. Hungary's Experience

During the mid-1990s, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland showed the highest rates of growth in GDP and industrial production of all the transition economies. Since 1997, however, Hungary has had the highest rates of growth in industrial production in the group at 11.1% in 1997, 12.6% in 1998, and 10.5% in 1999. GDP growth has also been strong. Professor Szamuely thus turned his presentation to the question of what has happened in Hungary over the last 4-5 years to contribute to this remarkable record. The answer, he argued, is very clear: Hungary has benefited from a massive inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The current cumulative stock of FDI in Hungary is over US$20 billion in a country with around 10 million people. Hungary's per capita stock of FDI is thus approximately $2000, an extremely high figure internationally (and not simply in the transition economies). This rapid inflow of FDI is in turn explained by the ways in which consecutive Hungarian governments have dealt with the privatization of state property. The dominant form of privatization in Hungary was and continues to be (though the process is mostly completed) cash privatization through the sale of public property for money, a form which differs from both the distribution of state assets according to the putative entitlements of various social groups and from the "insider privatization" that has characterized some other transition economies.

For transition economies to attract fresh capital, technology, marketing ability, and so forth, Professor Szamuely argued, it is necessary for them to attract foreign buyers. As a result of the Hungarian government's decision to open the economy to foreign investors, a remarkable 60% of Hungarian manufacturing has come to be owned by foreigners. Similarly, at least 80% of Hungarian banks and other financial institutions (such as insurance companies) are foreign-owned, with only two big savings banks still in Hungarian (primarily state) hands. FDI has not been dominated by any particular country, a situation which differs from that of most other Eastern European countries which have seen foreign capital flows dominated by Germany. Japan's Suzuki Motors was the first major foreign investor in post-Communist Hungary, building a car factory which produces what are now the most popular cars in Hungary. German and US capital hold a roughly equal share of FDI, with Austria, France, and Italy also major contributors.

A double-faced process has resulted from these economic policies. First, pre-1989 enterprises in Hungary have simply been closed down or eliminated and replaced with new, greenfield enterprises. Second, since 1998 the structure of Hungarian exports has changed substantially. Until very recently it has been a commonplace that Hungary was primarily an agricultural country, and products like wine, salami, and paprika have predominated in Hungarian exports. In 1998, however, over 51% of Hungary's exports were of machines and equipment, and the figure was higher in 1999. These products include computers (made by companies such as IBM and Hewlett Packard) and telecommunications equipment. As an illustration of this change, Professor Szamuely mentioned that the refrigerator in his guest room at the University of Tokyo was made in Hungary. He was also quick to note, however, that although this structural change is very much a positive one, it has been caused in part by the desperate state of Hungarian agriculture, which he compared to the situation in Poland described by Professor Kowalik. However, Hungary is now running a trade surplus with the EU (to which 3/4 of Hungarian exports are destined), while most of its deficit in trade comes from Russia. Hungary buys a good deal of oil and gas from Russia, while the Russians buy almost nothing from Hungary as "machines and equipment and electronics and so on are not for them."

In spite of the Asian and Russian economic crises and the crisis in Kosovo, Hungarian industrial growth has gone from strength to strength as a result of FDI by multinational corporations. Hungary is now fully incorporated into the production and export networks of MNCs, and it is this fact which explains the country's recent economic growth. This is not to say, however, that the last ten years have been without negative aspects. Even if GDP has returned to the levels of 1990, real wages continue to lag 12.2% behind the level of that year, which was itself at least 13% below that of the late 1970s. As a result, contemporary real wages in Hungary are approximately 25% lower than they were a quarter of a century ago. In addition, radical economic structural change has meant that 1/3 of the people who were employed in 1990 are now out of work for reasons such as retirement, unemployment, and inactivity. As in Poland, these unemployment figures certainly understate the real problem, as they incorporate only the registered unemployed. Real and heavy social costs have thus accompanied economic transformation in Hungary.

3. Prospects and Evaluations

Professor Szamuely ended his talk with a series of comments on Hungary's future prospects and on the evaluation of the country's progress to date. He noted first that recent economic growth seems quite stable and that growth in employment, while still extremely slow, has begun. Average real wages have also improved for two years running, although, again, the price of this improvement has been heavy and it can't be forgotten that real wages continue to lag behind those of a generation ago. As for the evaluations of the Hungarian people themselves regarding the changes of the last ten years, Professor Szamuely cited a series of public opinion polls which show that while the majority of Hungarians support the present parliamentary regime, NATO membership, and the application to join the European Union, they simultaneously say when asked to compare their present life with that under the Kadar regime that they lived better under the previous system. Overall, Professor Szamuely concluded that Hungary and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe have already been integrated into the industrial heartland of Western Europe in all ways save their life conditions. The countries of the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, however, represent quite a different story.

＜記録：Derek Hall＞