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CREP Seminar

APPRAISAL OF THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT 2005:
FROM SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

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1. Major Points of the East Asia Summit: With Special Reference to Declarations and Statements

(1) Goal:

-peace, security, and prosperity in East Asia and the world at large

(2) Principle:

-equality, partnership, consultation, and consensus
(ASEAN way of problem-solving)

(3) Function:

-open, inclusive, transparent, and outward-looking forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues
-promotion of community building in East Asia, reinforcing ASEAN Community (ASEAN Community first, and East Asian Community later as a long term goal)

(4) Agenda:

-political and security issues
(e.g. Six-Party Talks regarding N. Korea's nuclear program/ terrorism/ maritime security/ cf. ASEAN-led ARF's enhanced role in ASEAN declaration)
-development, financial stability, energy security, economic integration, control of infectious disease, and narrowing gap
(e.g. the most concrete achievement: East Asia Summit Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response/ development of fuel efficient technologies, and alternative energy sources/ FTA between ASEAN and other participants/ abiding commitment to the objectives of Doha agenda of WTO)
-cultural understanding

(5) Modality:

-convene regularly (annually)/ informal, retreat style format
-ASEAN-led forum, ASEAN as the driving force
-ASEAN Plus Three as the main vehicle for the future East Asian Community
-East Asia Summit and ASEAN Plus Three are "parallel tracks."

2. Special Features of the East Asia Summit 2005

- initiative: ASEAN-centered extended summit (“ASEAN + 6”), instead of equal partnership between SEA and NEA previously based on ASEAN Plus Three
ASEAN as “driving force” (nodal point or attractor, at least)
(Why? lack of cooperation between NEA countries, especially owing to Japan-China competition)
- China factor: inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand (with Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan’s support) to counterbalance China/ as a result, China’s depleted interest in the East Asia Summit
- status of ASEAN Plus Three: the “vehicle” for the process of East Asia Summit in theory, but decline in its function due to the aborted Japan-China-S.Korea summit in practice
- security: absence of momentum for the solution of existing and looming security issues
- economy: feasibility of extension of the magnitude of regional economic cooperation (see Table 1, ASEAN + 6 compared with other regional blocs)

3. Observations on Current Security Situation in East Asia

(1) Summary:

- Security threat (both in military threat and perception) impedes or delays further economic cooperation, fostering zero-sum mentality in regional dimension.
- With China’s rise and multilateral diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, there has emerged a linkage between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia in security affairs.
- The regional security in East Asia will largely depend upon how to alleviate the tension attributable to the Japan-China rivalry, the most dreadful looming threat, as well as to solve the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. But there is no proactive multilateral mechanism for the solution. (cf. CSCE during the Cold War period)
- The regional security will also depend on how to induce China’s cooperative posture and in turn, how to cultivate practices of multilateral cooperation, offsetting impact of strengthening Japan-U.S. alliance.
- ARF with ASEAN way of problem-solving (consensus approach, non-interference with domestic affairs) has been useful to a certain extent, but the above contentious security situation requires more assertive institutionalization of the Forum.

(2) Security threats in East Asia:

- traditional: North Korea’s nuclear development/ Taiwan Strait tension
- nontraditional: terrorism/ drug trafficking/ infectious diseases like avian flue
- looming dangers: nationalism/ energy competition/ and territorial disputes (the zone of overlapping the three dangers=the zone of potential for conflict)

(3) During Cold War era:

- SEA and NEA as two different regions.
- two flash points: Vietnam in SEA and Korean peninsula in NEA.

- in SEA: ASEAN as a device for security cooperation. Purpose: strategic coalition for anti-communism (particularly Vietnam), mutual recognition of sovereignty.
- in NEA: predominance of U.S.-led alliances

(4) Post-Cold War era:

- tying together (in security affairs) between SEA and NEA, and its instrument ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
- momentum of transition in SEA: superpower disengagement and China's empowerment in both security and economy
- e.g. Russian forces out of Cam Rahn Bay by 1992/ U.S. forces out of the Philippines by 1992/ U.S.-Vietnam normalization in 1995/ China's territorial irredentist attempts in South China Sea
- transition in NEA: N.Korea's program of WMD and China's moderating role (participation in ARF in 1994, and initiation of creating multilateral organizations like Shanghai Five in 1996 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001)/ Taiwan Strait tension especially in 1995-96/ strengthening Japan-U.S. alliance/ resulting Japan-China rivalry

4. ASEAN Regional Forum: Present and Future

(1) Formation of ARF as the only comprehensive security mechanism in East Asia

- background: shared concern of SEA and NEA countries about China's empowerment/ China's increased security role
- China in the South China Sea dispute: started against Vietnam but affected later Malaysia and the Philippines (see Table 3)
- ASEAN's attempt for counterbalancing China's influence/ search for a solution in Asia-Pacific context
- Japan's initiative: MOFA officials' conceiving of the necessity of "multi-tiered" security device in the midst of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines in 1992 and the eruption of N. Korea's nuclear development in 1993.
- (Multi-tiered: U.S.-led bilateral alliance, subregional ad-hoc arrangement, region-wide security dialogue, and non-security arrangement)

(2) ARF's approach:

- confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution
- ARF's implicit mission: "socialize China"-successful to a certain extent (note the inclusion of regional neighbors such as India, Australia, New Zealand, as well as global powers like U.S., E.U., and Russia/ see Table 2)
- China's adaptation: participation in this multilateral institution (cf. Shanghai Five in 1996 and later Shanghai Cooperation Group in 2001/ ASEAN Plus Three in 1997)/ upgrading its image of "peaceful rise" instead of "China threat"
- ARF's auxiliary: Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) as track two (or tack 1.5) arrangements, which include academics and policy analysts/ track two is in accordance with the traditional approach of ASEAN's problem-solving, relying on informal and quiet consultation

(3) ARF's achievements:

- institutionalized appeasement of China, at the very least, or collective foundation for balancing against China, at the very most
- (e.g. ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea)

(4) ARF's limitation:

- absence of enforcement power
- ASEAN Way of problem-solving (consensus approach, non-interference of domestic affairs)
- remain basically a device for ASEAN security community because of its ASEAN-led mechanism
- no membership of Taiwan, one of the key disputes

5. Expected Role of East Asia Summit for the Regional Security

(1) Preliminary question:

- any alternative to ARF? Neither feasible alternative mechanism to replace ARF nor complementary mechanism in the midst of Japan-China contention/ but necessity of more proactive institution.

(2) Facilitation of ARF-turned security institution

- It is necessary to transform the existing ARF, the multilateral forum, into a more assertive institution/ touching upon outstanding confrontational issues in East Asia (territorial dispute, provocation pertaining to historical issues)/ facilitating issue-specific security committees

- In view of the significance of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) signed in 1995, the new ARF-turned security institution should commit to the nuclear issue of the member countries (China, U.S., as well as North Korea), if not immediate elimination/ and arms reduction.

- Geographical scope does not matter. Note that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during the Cold War covered the entire northern hemisphere ("from Vladivostok to Vancouver").

5. East China Sea Dispute

(1) General trend regarding territorial disputes

- the percentage of wars over territorial disputes has been declined, even though territorial disputes have resulted in more wars historically than any other single issues.
- regime type does not matter (see ASEAN countries).
- conflict management is much easier if both sides are able to separate the territorial dispute from other contentious issues.
- ASEAN's case has done a better work in conflict prevention than in conflict resolution.

(2) East China Sea: not necessarily pessimistic

-China: the country with the longest border and the largest number of neighbors in the world/ recent trend of peaceful solution of border disputes, especially with Russia/ its concern about its image of “peaceful rise” and recent trend of grading up multilateral approach

(see Table 3 for the ASEAN-China in the South China Sea).

-Japan: attempts for negotiation regarding collective exploration of natural resources

- ARF or ARF-turned institution (or East Asia Summit): should facilitate informal meetings and workshops

Table 1. GDP and Trade: compared with other regional blocs (in 2004)

	GDP		Trade	
	billion dollars	%	billion dollars	%
ASEAN	796.8	1.94	1,025.0	5.63
Japan, China, S.Korea	7,006.2	17.05	2,517.6	13.83
ASEAN + 3	7,802.9	18.99	3,542.7	19.46
India, Australia, N.Z.	1,412.3	3.44	378.5	2.08
ASEAN + 6	9,215.3	22.43	3,921.1	21.54
NAFTA	13,402.5	32.62	3,183.4	17.48
E.U.	12,845.4	31.26	7,329.2	40.25
World	41,086.3	100.00	18,207.0	100.00

Table 2. Membership of ASEAN-related institutions

	ASEAN (1967)	ASEAN+3 (1997)	ARF (1994)	APEC (1989)	East Asia Summit (2005)	Six-Party Talks (2003)
Indonesia	O	O	O	O	O	
Malaysia	O	O	O	O	O	
Singapore	O	O	O	O	O	
Philippines	O	O	O	O	O	
Thailand	O	O	O	O	O	
Brunei	O	O	O	O	O	
Vietnam	O	O	O	O	O	
Laos	O	O	O		O	
Myanmar	O	O	O		O	
Cambodia	O	O	O		O	
Japan		O	O	O	O	O
China		O	O	O	O	O
S. Korea		O	O	O	O	O
India			O		O	
Australia			O	O	O	
N. Z.			O	O	O	
Russia			O	O		O
U. S.			O	O		O
E. U.			O			
Canada			O	O		
N. Korea			O			O
Mongol			O			
Papua New Guinea				O		
Mexico				O		
Chile				O		
Peru				O		
Taiwan				O		
Hong Kong				O		

Table 3. Clashes and Preventive Efforts in the South China Sea

Year	Countries Involved	Clash Spots or Agreements	
1988	China, Vietnam	Johnson Reef	
1992	China, Vietnam	Gulf of Tonkin, Da Luc Reef	
1992	ASEAN	Declaration on the South China Sea	+
1994	China, Vietnam	in Vietnam's internationally recognized territorial waters	
1995	China, Philippines	Mischief Reef	
1995	Taiwan, Vietnam	near Itu Abu	
1995	China, Malaysia	near Sarawak	
1996	China, Philippines	near Campones Island	
1997	China, Philippines	Scarborough Shoal, Panata and Kota Islands	
1998	China, Philippines	near Scarborough Shoal	
1998	Philippine, Vietnam	near Tennent (Pigeon) Reef	
1998	ASEAN	Hanoi Action Plan to govern ASEAN-China relations vis-à-vis the South China Sea	+
1999	China, Philippines	near Scarborough Shoal	
1999	Philippines, Vietnam	near Tennent Reef	
1999	Malaysia, Philippines	Investigator Shoal	
2002	ASEAN, China	Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea	+
2005	China, Vietnam, Philippines	Joint research for the oil exploration in Spratly Islands	+