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Regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe The Impact of Investment Frameworks on Economic Integration and Institutional Reform

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Outlook

- International Investment Frameworks
 - Core-Element of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)
 - > Tool for Structural Reforms, Capacity Building, Reg. Integration
- Scope and Effectiveness
 - Regional Competition vs. International Cooperation
- Evidence from Extreme Cases: EU Enlargement
 - FDI Promotion and Institutional Reform
- Results for EU & Asia
 - Competition of Policies
 - Governance Reform
 - Harmonization of Frameworks

Investment Frameworks


- Domestic Investment Frameworks (Competitive)
 - Historically Grown Complexity
 - "Structural Reform" Limitations
 - Industrial Policy Distortions
 - Investment Promotion Costs

- Policy Options
 - Investment Promotion (Competitive)
 - Protection/Incentives
 - Economic Reform


- Countries Do Not Compete: Little Progress
- International Investment Frameworks (Cooperative)
 - Next Step after FTAs
 - Globalization
 - Production Networks
 - Service Investment
- Negotiation Complexity & Commitment: Little Progress
- Best Practice: Policies of General Liberalization & Deregulation?

- Policy Options
 - Regionalization (Cooperative)
 - Protection/Standards
 - Institutional Reform

Determinants of FDI Flows



FDI Policy Options



Competitive Policy

Reduction of Transact. Costs, Risks, Taxes

- ➤ Tariffs
- ➤ Tax Holidays
 - ➤ Export Support, Signaling Device
- ➤ Cash Incentives
 - ➤ Effect on Specific Industries, SMEs
- ➤ Tax Regimes

Cooperative Policy

International Agreements

- ➤ BITs (Non-discrimination, Dispute Settlement)
 - ➤ Focus on Diplomacy, Weak Institutions
- ➤ Tax Treatise (Double Taxation, Harmonization)
 - > For Established Investment Relations
- Multilateral WTO
 - ➤ Break-down of OECD-MAI Top-Down Approach, Slow on Bottom-Up Negotiations; Differences of Developed and Developing Country Interests
- ➤ Multilateral EPAs
 - ➤ Competition for Investment; Support for Industrial Policy and Spillovers

Framework Example: Japan-Singapore Agreement Trade++ Issues

"New-Age Economic Partnerships"

- Mutual Recognition Procedures
- Rules of Origin
- Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
- > E-Trade
- Investment Facilitation
- Service Sector Liberalization beyond WTO
- Financial Services
- Human Resources Development
- Science and Technology
- Small and Medium Enterprises
- ICT & Broadcasting

State of Affairs

- NAFTA (Investment Liberalization)
 - Negative List Approach
 - Limited Institutional Reform
- ASEAN (Investment Cooperation)
 - Investor Guarantees
 - No Strategic Investor in Group
- EU Acquis (Investment Competition / Institutional Cooperation)
 - Not Developed as an Investment Framework
 - Slow Impact on Core Sectors (Agriculture/Transport/Finance)
- EU Enlargement Acquis
 - Acquis gets Investment Framework Focus
 - Governance & Institutional Reform
 - Different Approaches (Czech: Top Down / Poland: Bottom Up)
 - Limited Impact on Investment Protection (BITs and International Arbitration Superior?)

EU Integration: The "Aquis" Evolves

- > Free Movement of Goods, Persons, Services, Capital
- ➤ Customs Union, Taxation (mostly VAT), EMU
- ➤ Agriculture, Fisheries, Transport, Energy Policy
- ➤ Environment, Consumer and Health Protection
- ➤ Telecommunications and Information Technologies




Governance Reform

- ➤ Company Law, Competition Policy
- ➤ Justice and Home Affairs
- Financial and Budgetary Control and Provisions
- ➤ Statistics, Industrial Policy, SME
- ➤ Common External Relations and Security Policy
- ➤ Science and Research, Education and Training
- ➤ Regional and Structural Policy
- ➤ Social Policy and Employment
- ➤ Culture and Audio-Visual Policy



EU Common Market: Impact Depends on Framework Reforms


Accession Country GDP Out-Performance (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal)



Note: Growth rates are plotted as PPS per capita as % of the EU15's average. Percentage point changes therefore mark strong growth on top of EU-15 growth in real per capita terms. Source: © FRI 2005. Data from EuroStat (2005).

Outperformance: National Policy, Market Size Matter

Regional GDP/Capita Out-performance above 5% of the EU-25 or National Index (1997-2002)




Remark: Above 5 (percentage) points change relative to the EU-25 GDP (PPP) per capita index average (=100) or to the national index position. Source: © FRI 2005. Data from Eurostat Inforegio (2005).

CEE Regional Integration Experience

- Strong Impact of Globalization from EU Single Market
 - Pressure for Privatization, Structural Reform, and Internationalization
- Strong Need for Finance and Services
 - Unsuccessful "Closed-Shop" Transformation led to Financial Reforms and FDI Promotion
- Strong Advantage in Wages and Engineering
 - > Fitting into EU-wide Production Networks
 - Promoting Manufacturing and Supply-Chain Development
- Taking Chances with EU EPA and Accession
 - EU-Focused Structural Reforms and Capacity Building
- Taking Advantage of Support and Development Frameworks
 - Structural Funds and ODA for Capacity Building


Competition Policy Enforcement through Accession Negotiations

- Competition Policy (especially Anti-Trust and State-Aid Control)
 - LawEnforcement(Cases and Fines)
 - Competition
 Advocacy
 (Additions,
 Comments,
 Objections in
 Legislation and
 Regulations)
 - Institutional Effectiveness (Agency Independence, Transparency, Appeals based on Economic Content)




Source: Vagliasindi (2001).

Driving Force of Market Reform: FDI




Source: © FRI 2005. Data from UNCTAD (2005) – World Investment Report 2004.

Regional Reforms: CEE Financial Reform



Source: EBRD (2003) and UNECE (2004) – Economic Survey of Europe.


Regional Potentials & Production Network Chances Regional Employment by Sector



Remark: Percent of sector of overall employment. Source: Eurostat Inforegio (2004): Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion.

EU Hegemony Blocks Regional Integration?


Trade Integration ((Ex+Im)/GDP*2*100) Change Rate (1996-2004) and as Percent of GDP (2004)



Note: GDP on US Dollar basis; calculated on basis of average Forex rates of calendar year. Source: © FRI 2006. Data from IMF (2005): Direction of Trade Statistics; IMF (2006): IFS.

Domestic Market Reform: Investment Agencies Impact

- Role
 - Improve FDI Quantity, Quality
 - Increase Project Competition
 - Improve the Investment Environment
- Tasks
 - Marketing with Product, Promotional, and Pricing Strategies
 - Screening Investment Proposals
 - Monitoring Foreign Investment
 - Intervening to solve Problems
- Scope
 - > From Information Center to Executive One-Stop-Shop
- Type
 - Best Results with Quasi-Governmental Agencies



Czech Republic: One-Stop-Shop Investment Agency

Traditional "Advertisement"
Promotion is Successful, but less
so in Developing Countries

Investor Service:

- -Real Estate
- -Regulations
- -Human Resources
- -Finance
- -Supply Chains

One-Stop-Shop:

- -Advertisement
 - -Incentives
- -Consulting/Service
 - -Deal-Making
 - -Legal Support

Bureaucratic Support:


- -Applications
 - -Mediation
- -Exec. Functions
 -Advisory

Frameworks Advisory:

- -Incentive Development
 - -Investor Demands
 - -Legal Changes
- -International Agreements

Czech Production Focus: Autos & Export

But Employment & Domestic Investment Stagnant




Source: © FRI 2005. Data from Czech Statistical Office (2005) – National Accounts.

Limitations of "Classic" FDI Promotion: Tax Breaks and Special Economic Zones

CEE Tax Revenue Composition

Czech Regional FDI Composition



Regional Structural Reforms: Slovakia Tax Reform

- 1995: Tax Rates Among Europe's Highest
 - Tax Share: 37% of GDP
 - Social Security: 50% of Taxable Income
- Until 2004: Regional Tax Competition
 - > Following Ireland and the Baltic Countries
 - Corporate Tax Rate Reduction: 40%
- 2004: Comprehensive Tax Reform
 - Corporate Tax

 - > VAT

> Personal Income Tax > 19% Flat-Tax

Reverse Integration: Strong Enlargement Impact

EU Outlook after Enlargement

- Less Policy-Coordination
 - No Tax Harmonization, more Tax Competition
 - No "United States of Europe"
- Less Top-Down Decision Making
 - Intergovernmental Negotiations lost Credibility
 - Step-wise Reform of Majority-Voting
- More Regional Initiatives
 - > EU cannot Implement or Enforce Structural Reforms
 - Regional Governments Drive Structural Reform
- More Economic Union
 - Increasing Market Size, Competition, Differentials
 - "Economic Enlargement" through Association Agreements

Frameworks in Europe and Asia

EU

- Free Trade, Internal Market, Harmonization
 - > Investment Focus
 - Institution Building
 - Structural Development Programs
- Investment Framework
 - Strong FDI Competition
 - General Tax Competition
 - ➤ Competition Policy
 - ➤ Governance Standards
 - > EU Court
 - EU Executive (Commission)

Competition



ASEAN

- Trade Frictions, Investors Outside the Region
 - > Trade Harmonization
 - Transparency, Inf. Sharing
 - > Technical Cooperation
- ➤ Investment Framework
 - > Harmonization
 - Minimum-Tax-Breaks to Attract FDI as a Region
 - ➤ Special Economic Zones
 - ➤ BIT Arbitration

Harmonization

Results for Asian Integration Plans (ASEAN+X)

- Integration of Major Investors Japan, Korea, China (+3)
- Competition of Tax and FDI Policies
- FDI-focused Governance Reform
- Limiting Harmonization and Integration Goals
 - ➤ Mutual Recognition of Standards
 - > Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes are Insufficient Coordination and Enforcement Mechanisms
 - Currency Unions work as a strong Coordination and Enforcement Mechanisms, but require Political Integration
- Focus on a Core-Sector: Finance (Old-EU: Steel & Coal = Military; New-EU: Finance)
- International Institutions can Support Structural Reforms
- ➤ Effective Arbitration, Cooperative Structural Support Schemes, Capacity Building